Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2009

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, Nos. 08-1298, 09-89
(U.S. Nov. 16, 2009)
David Cole
Georgetown University Law Center, cole@law.georgetown.edu

Docket No. 08-1298, 09-89
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb/65

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Nos. 08-1498 and 09-89

In the Supreme Court of the United States
________________________

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT, ET AL.
_____________
HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT, ET AL., CROSS-PETITIONERS
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.
_____________
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

________________________
OPENING BRIEF FOR
HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT, ET AL.
________________________
DAVID D. COLE
c/o Georgetown Univ. Law Center
600 New Jersey Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 662-9078
Counsel of Record for
Respondents/Cross-Petitioners
Humanitarian Law Project et al.
(additional counsel on following page)

SHAYANA KADIDAL
JULES LOBEL
Center for Constitutional
Rights
666 Broadway, 7th floor
New York, NY 10012
(212) 614-6438
RICHARD G. TARANTO
Farr & Taranto
1150 18th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 775-0184
CLIFFORD Y. CHEN
Watkins, Bradley & Chen
LLP
228 Park Avenue South
#14905
New York, NY 10003
(212) 937-4281

CAROL SOBEL
429 Santa Monica Blvd.,
Suite 550
Santa Monica, CA 90401
(310) 393-3055
PAUL HOFFMAN
Schonbrun, De Simone,
Seplow, Harris and
Hoffman LLP
723 Ocean Front Walk
Venice, CA 90291
(310) 396-0731
VISUVANATHAN
RUDRAKUMARAN
875 Ave. of the Americas
New York, NY 10001
(212) 290-2925

Counsel for Respondents in 08-1498
and Cross-Petitioners in 09-89,
Humanitarian Law Project et al.

i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)’s criminal
prohibitions on the provision of “training,” “expert
advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” to
government-designated “terrorist organizations” are
unconstitutional as applied to pure speech that
promotes only lawful, nonviolent activities.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The following parties were plaintiffs in the
district court and appellees and cross-appellants in
the court of appeals, and are respondents and crosspetitioners in this Court:1 Humanitarian Law
Project; Ralph Fertig; Ilankai Thamil Sangam;
Tamils of Northern California; Tamil Welfare and
Human Rights Committee; Federation of Tamil
Sangams of North America; World Tamil
Coordinating
Committee;
and
Nagalingam
Jeyalingam. This brief refers to these parties as
plaintiffs.
The following parties were defendants in the
district court and appellants and cross-appellees in
the court of appeals, and are petitioners and crossrespondents in this Court: the Attorney General of
the United States, Eric Holder, Jr.; the United States
Department of Justice; the United States Secretary
of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton; and the United
States Department of State. This brief refers to
these parties as defendants.

1

On November 2, 2009, this Court granted the parties’ motion to
amend the briefing schedule. This brief therefore addresses the questions
presented in both the petition (08-1498) and conditional cross-petition
(09-89) for writs of certiorari.

iii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Humanitarian Law Project, Ilankai Thamil
Sangam, Tamils of Northern California, Tamil
Welfare and Human Rights Committee, Federation
of Tamil Sangams of North America, and World
Tamil Coordinating Committee have no parent
corporations and there are no publicly held
corporations holding any of their stock.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a32a) is reported at 552 F.3d 916. Earlier opinions of
the court of appeals are reported at 393 F.3d 902,
352 F.3d 382, and 205 F.3d 1130. The opinion of the
district court (Pet. App. 33a-76a) is reported at 380
F. Supp. 2d 1134. Earlier opinions of the district
court are reported at 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 9 F.
Supp. 2d 1205, and 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1). The judgment of the court of appeals was
entered on December 10, 2007.
A petition for
rehearing was denied on January 5, 2009 (Pet. App.
3a). Justice Kennedy extended the time for filing a
petition for certiorari to June 4, 2009, and
defendants filed a petition that day. Plaintiffs filed a
conditional cross-petition for certiorari on July 6,
2009.
The Court granted both petitions on
September 30, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “Congress
shall make no law … abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble.”
The Fifth Amendment
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provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall … be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” Relevant statutory provisions are
reprinted at Pet. App. 77a-81a and in a Statutory
Appendix to this brief. App. 1a-4a.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs – a retired judge, a medical doctor, a
human rights organization, and several nonprofit
groups – seek to engage in pure political speech
promoting lawful, nonviolent activity. Specifically,
they would like to resume what they were doing
before the statutory prohibitions at issue here were
triggered: teaching and advocating the use of
international law and other nonviolent means to
reduce conflict, advance human rights, and promote
peace. Under defendants’ interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, however, if plaintiffs communicate such
ideas to, for, or with direction from an organization
that the government has labeled terrorist, they risk
prosecution under that statute, which makes it a
crime, punishable by fifteen years in prison, to
provide “training,” “expert advice or assistance,”
“service,” or “personnel” to such groups.
The
government has stated unequivocally that these
provisions make it a crime for plaintiffs to submit an
amicus brief in federal court, to petition Congress or
the United Nations for legal reform, or even to speak
to the media, for the benefit of a designated
organization, as well as to teach such an
organization human rights advocacy or English. See
infra, pp. 12-13, 27-28.
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The statute at issue employs ill-defined or
undefined terms to criminalize pure speech. It
proscribes speech by express reference to its content.
It is triggered by the Secretary of State’s selective
designation of “terrorist organizations,” based on
criteria that are in part explicitly political. And as
interpreted by the government, it imposes criminal
liability on speech and association without any
showing that the speaker intended to incite or
promote terrorist activity in any way. Indeed, on the
government’s reading, the statute makes speech a
crime even if the speaker succeeds in reducing resort
to violence by encouraging peaceful resolution of
conflict.
It is undisputed that both of the organizations
that plaintiffs seek to speak to, for, and in
coordination with – the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) – engage in a wide range of lawful,
nonviolent activity, and that plaintiffs seek to
further only such activity.
Thus, this case asks whether the statutory
provisions are constitutional as applied to pure
speech that promotes peaceable, nonviolent activity.
In that light, it is essential not to be misled by the
statutory language of “material support” for
“terrorist organizations.” That language and the
image it conjures have no relevance to plaintiffs’
challenge. Plaintiffs’ speech in favor of human rights
and peace is not material support in any familiar
sense of that term. Nor does it promote terrorist
activity; indeed, its purpose is to discourage violence.
Accurate identification of the actual legal questions,

4
therefore, requires a focus on the particular
provisions and specific speech at issue, rather than a
general invocation of the misleading nomenclature of
“material support” for a “terrorist organization.”
Plaintiffs maintain that, as applied to their
proposed speech, the challenged provisions are
intolerably vague, discriminate on the basis of
content, and penalize pure speech and association.
The government has a compelling interest in
combating terrorism, but as this Court has insisted,
it must pursue that interest with respect for
fundamental constitutional constraints. See, e.g.,
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). This statute’s
sweeping criminalization of human rights advocacy
and other speech fails that test.
STATEMENT
A. The Statutory Scheme
Sections 302 and 303 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189 and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, respectively,
authorize the Secretary of State to designate “foreign
terrorist organizations,” and make it a crime to
provide certain statutorily defined “material support”
for even the nonviolent and humanitarian activities
of such groups.2
Congress amended the statute in the USA Patriot Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (2001),
and again in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(b), 118 Stat.

2
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Congress has authorized the Secretary to
designate as “terrorist” any group (1) that is foreign;
(2) that “engages in terrorist activity,” defined to
include virtually any unlawful actual or threatened
use of a weapon against person or property; and (3)
whose activities threaten “national security,”
expansively defined as the “national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests of the United
States.”3 The Secretary’s determination with respect
to the third, expressly political “national security”
criterion has been deemed a judicially unreviewable
“political judgment[].” People’s Mojahedin Org. of
Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104-05
(2000). The Secretary is therefore free to designate
as “terrorist” any foreign group that has used or
threatened to use violence based on an unreviewable
assessment of whether the group advances or
impairs American foreign policy or economic
interests.
The authority has been employed
selectively; many groups that use violence, including
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), have never been
designated “terrorist.” See Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Foreign
3638, 3762-64 (2004).
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (criteria for designation); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)-(VI) (defining “terrorist activity” to
include, among other things, any unlawful use of, or threat to
use, a weapon against person or property, unless for mere
personal monetary gain); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(2) (definition of
“national security”). These statutes are reproduced in an
Appendix to this brief. App. 1a-4a.
3

6
Terrorist
Organizations
(Jul.
7,
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

2009),

Once the Secretary designates a group, it
becomes a crime to “knowingly provide[] material
support or resources” to the group. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a). Incorporating the definition set out in 18
U.S.C. § 2339A(b), the statute defines “material
support or resources” as:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service,
including currency or monetary instruments or
financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses,
false
documentation
or
identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons,
lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or
more individuals who may be or include
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or
religious materials.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (emphasis
incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4).

added),

The government interprets this statute to
permit punishment without any proof that an
individual intended, knew, or even should have
known that his speech would be used for any
terrorist, violent, or illicit purpose. It is enough that
he knew that the group he spoke to or for the benefit
of was designated or had engaged in terrorist
activities. It is no defense that his speech was
designed, as plaintiffs’ speech is here, to discourage
violence and to encourage lawful alternatives.

7
When Congress enacted the material-support
statute in 1996, it declared that any “contribution to”
a foreign organization that engages in terrorist
activity “facilitates that conduct.” AEDPA, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (April
24, 1996), 18 U.S.C. § 2339B note (emphasis added).
At the same time, however, the statute expressly
permits unlimited donations of medicine and
religious materials, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1), and
provision of such other forms of support as the
Secretary finds “may [not] be used to carry out
terrorist activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j).
A key House Report in the legislative process
states that the statute was not intended to reach
protected speech and association. The Report
recognizes that “[t]he First Amendment protects
one’s right to associate with groups that are involved
in both legal and illegal activities,” and insists that
“[t]he basic protection of free association afforded
individuals under the First Amendment remains in
place” because the statute does not prohibit “one’s
right to think, speak, or opine in concert with, or on
behalf of, such an organization.” H.R. Rep. No. 104383, at 43, 44 (1995). Quoting the Report, the
government argued below, after the 2001 and 2004
amendments, that the Report still reflected
Congress’s intent and even added: “Congress noted
that the statutory ban ‘only affects one’s contribution
of financial or material resources.’”4 Despite these
intentions, however, Congress defined “material

First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 5-6 (CA9 filed
Apr. 4, 2006) (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-383, at 44), quoted at
Plaintiffs’ Br. in Opp. 4-5.
4
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support” in ways that criminalize pure speech, as
this case demonstrates.
In 2004, after the courts in this case had declared
the prohibitions on “personnel,” “training,” and
“expert advice or assistance” impermissibly vague,
Congress added to the statute an express recognition
that application or construction of the statute might
infringe First Amendment interests, and specifically
disclaimed any intent to do so:
(i)

Rule of construction. – Nothing in this
section shall be construed or applied so as
to abridge the exercise of rights
guaranteed under the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (emphasis added). At the same
time, however, Congress added a new, undefined
prohibition on the provision of “service.”
And
Congress added definitions for the previously
invalidated provisions that continue to criminalize
pure speech and association, discriminate on the
basis of content, and leave their scope fundamentally
ambiguous.
Four prohibitions in the current version of the
statute are at issue here. First, the statute prohibits
the provision of “training,” which Congress defined
as “instruction or teaching designed to impart a
specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” 18
U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2).
Second, the statute outlaws the provision of
“expert advice or assistance,” which is defined as
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“advice or assistance derived from scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b)(3).
Third, the statute prohibits the provision of
“service” but leaves this term undefined. 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(b)(1).
The government maintains that
“service” broadly encompasses any “act done for the
benefit of” a designated group. Pet. 17.
Fourth, the statute bars the provision of
“personnel,” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1), which includes
any person, including oneself, who works under an
organization’s “direction or control,” but excludes
persons acting “entirely independently” of the group:
No person may be prosecuted under this section
in connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless
that person has knowingly provided, attempted
to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign
terrorist organization with 1 or more
individuals (who may be or include himself) to
work under that terrorist organization's
direction or control or to organize, manage,
supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of
that organization. Individuals who act entirely
independently
of
the
foreign
terrorist
organization to advance its goals or objectives
shall not be considered to be working under the
foreign terrorist organization’s direction and
control.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).
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B. Plaintiffs’ Intended Speech
Plaintiffs include the Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP), a longstanding human rights organization
with consultative status to the United Nations;
Ralph Fertig, a retired United States administrative
law judge who has served as the HLP’s President;
Nagalingam Jeyalingam, an American physician;
and several domestic nonprofit groups that focus on
the interests of persons of Tamil descent. Prior to
AEDPA’s enactment, the HLP and Judge Fertig had
been assisting the PKK by training them in how to
bring human rights complaints to the United
Nations, advocating on their behalf, and assisting
them in peace negotiations. Fertig Dec. ¶¶ 10-18, 2426, 30-32 (March 9, 1998); J.A. 113-23 (describing
HLP conduct prior to designation of PKK). They
halted such activities once the Secretary, in 1997,
designated
the
PKK
a
“foreign
terrorist
organization.”
As the district court found, the HLP and Judge
Fertig seek to
provide training in the use of humanitarian and
international law for the peaceful resolution of
disputes, engage in political advocacy on behalf
of the Kurds living in Turkey, and teach the
PKK how to petition for relief before
representative bodies like the United Nations.
Pet App. 35a; id. at 5a n.1. As Judge Fertig
explained, he and the HLP would like, among other
things, to “offer [their] services to advocate on behalf
of the rights of the Kurdish people and the PKK
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before the United Nations and the United States
Congress.” Fertig Dec. ¶ 16 (Mar. 9, 1998), J.A. 116;
see also Fertig Dec. ¶ 19 (May 11, 2005), J.A. 98
(same). They filed this lawsuit to seek injunctive
and declaratory relief that, inter alia, would allow
them to do so without being prosecuted for providing
“material support” to a designated group.
Dr. Jeyalingam and the Tamil organizations
similarly seek to speak in support of the
humanitarian and political activities of the LTTE,
which the Secretary of State, in 1997, also
designated a “foreign terrorist organization.” As the
district court found, the Tamil plaintiffs
seek to provide training in the presentation of
claims to mediators and international bodies for
tsunami-related aid, offer legal expertise in
negotiating peace agreements between the
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and
engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils
living in Sri Lanka.
Pet. App. 35a-36a; id. at 5a n.1.5
In this case, as resolved on summary judgment,
the following facts are undisputed: (1) both the PKK
and LTTE engage in a broad range of lawful
As the petition notes, the LTTE was recently defeated
militarily in Sri Lanka. Pet. 5 n.1. Much of the support the
Tamil organizations and Dr. Jeyalingam sought to provide is
now moot. However, the LTTE continues to exist as a political
organization outside Sri Lanka advocating for the rights of
Tamils, and plaintiffs continue to seek to support its lawful,
nonviolent activities through the speech identified by the
district court.
5
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activities, including the provision of social services,
political advocacy, and economic development, Pet.
App. 34a-36a; (2) the PKK is the principal political
organization representing the Kurds in Turkey, an
ethnic
minority
subjected
to
substantial
discrimination and human rights violations, id. at
34a-35a; (3) the LTTE is the principal political
organization representing the Tamils in Sri Lanka,
another ethnic minority that has been subjected to
human rights abuse and discrimination, id. at 35a;
and (4) plaintiffs intend to speak only in furtherance
of lawful and nonviolent activities of these groups.
Id. at 34a-36a (describing intended support).6
The government has made clear that it considers
plaintiffs’ intended activities criminally proscribed
by the challenged statutory terms. At oral argument
before the court of appeals, counsel for the
government maintained that if plaintiffs filed an
amicus brief for the LTTE in this lawsuit, advocated
on the group’s behalf before the United Nations,
asked Congress to grant the LTTE an exemption
from the statute, or provided advice on how to
mediate disputes, they would be engaged in criminal
activity under the statute.7
The government in its petition asserted that both the
LTTE and the PKK engaged in terrorist activities, but plaintiffs
both disputed the government’s evidence and argued that these
facts were immaterial. Pl. Statement of Genuine Issues in
Response to Def. Mot. for Summ. Jdgmt. (July 18, 2005).
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals made any
finding regarding terrorist activities of either group.

6

The tape of the oral argument is available at:
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=00
00004505. The remarks quoted above occur at 33:15, 34:30,

7
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For example, the court asked government
counsel: “If you have an attorney in the U.S. who
wishes to counsel one of these organizations on how
to argue their case, or how to bring their case, before
the United Nations, is that a crime?” Counsel for the
government replied: “Yes, your honor. We do not
want U.S. persons to be assisting terrorist
organizations in making presentations to the U.N., to
television, to a newspaper, we do not want U.S.
persons assisting these organizations except as
Congress specifically has provided.”8
C. The Decisions Below
Plaintiffs filed this action in 1998, challenging
the statute on First and Fifth Amendment grounds.
They asserted, among other things, that the statute’s
prohibitions on providing “training” and “personnel”
were unconstitutionally vague. (Neither term was
defined in the original 1996 statute.) The district
court granted plaintiffs a preliminary and then a
permanent injunction barring enforcement of those
two provisions against plaintiffs’ proposed activities,
finding them unconstitutionally vague. See Pet. App.
6a-7a.
It rejected plaintiffs’ other challenges,
including their contention that the statute infringed
their right of association. Id. The court of appeals
unanimously affirmed the preliminary injunction in

36:00, and 41:02.
8

Id. at 39:20.
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2000 and the permanent injunction in 2003. Id. at
7a, 8a.9
Meanwhile, Congress amended the statute in
2001 to add another undefined prohibition on speech,
barring the provision of “expert advice or assistance.”
Plaintiffs filed a second challenge, and in March
2004, the district court held that this provision, too,
is unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 8a.
In September 2004, in the first case, the court of
appeals granted rehearing en banc (on requests from
both parties). Id. at 9a. While en banc review was
pending, Congress in 2004 amended the statute
again,
providing
definitions
for
“training,”
“personnel,” and “expert advice or assistance,” and
adding a new, and undefined, prohibition on the
provision of “service.” Id. at 9a-10a. The en banc
court of appeals remanded for consideration of the
effect of those statutory amendments. Id. at 11a.
On remand, the district court held that
Congress’s new definition of “personnel” cured the
vagueness of that provision, but that the new
definition of “training” and part of the new definition
of “expert advice or assistance” (concerning
“specialized knowledge”) were unconstitutionally
vague as applied to plaintiffs’ proposed speech. Id. at
62a-66a, 68a-69a.
It also held that the new
prohibition on “service” was unconstitutionally vague
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (HLP I), 205 F.3d 1130,
1137-38 (9th Cir. 2000); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and
remanded in light of intervening legislation, 393 F.3d 902 (9th
Cir. 2004) (en banc).
9
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as applied to plaintiffs’ speech. Id. at 66a-68a. The
district
court
rejected
plaintiffs’
remaining
contentions. Id. at 46a-60a, 69a-74a.
Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals
once again unanimously affirmed. It reasoned that
the constitutional “requirement for clarity is
enhanced” where, as here, a criminal statute touches
on “sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms.” Id. at 20a (internal quotations omitted).
It emphasized that it was addressing the provisions’
vagueness only as applied to plaintiffs’ intended
speech. Id. at 2a, 22a n.6, 5a n.1 (describing
plaintiffs’ proposed speech).
With respect to “training,” the court found it
“highly unlikely that a person of ordinary
intelligence would know whether, when teaching
someone to petition international bodies for tsunamirelated aid, one is imparting a ‘specific skill’ or
‘general knowledge.’” Id. at 21a-22a. Stressing that
the term as defined “could still be read to encompass
speech and advocacy protected by the First
Amendment,” id. at 22a, the court held that
the term “training” remains impermissibly
vague because it “implicates, and potentially
chills, Plaintiffs’ protected expressive activities
and imposes criminal sanctions of up to fifteen
years
imprisonment
without
sufficiently
defining the prohibited conduct for ordinary
people to understand.”
Id. at 22a-23a (quoting id. at 64a).

16
The court noted that the prohibition on “expert
advice or assistance” similarly encompasses
protected speech or advocacy. Id. at 24a. It held
that the prohibition on advice or assistance “derived
from … other specialized knowledge” was
impermissibly vague, id. at 23a-24a, but it upheld
the prohibition on advice or assistance “derived from
scientific [or] technical … knowledge.” Id. at 24a.
The court offered no reasoning for upholding this
aspect of the statute, and merely cited school reading
lists that identified “technical” as a fifth-grade
vocabulary word and “scientific method” as a thirdgrade vocabulary word. Id.
The court also deemed vague, as applied, the
prohibition on “service,” which Congress left
undefined, but which defendants have stated applies
to anything done “for the benefit of” a designated
group. Id. at 25a (adopting district court’s holding
and reasoning at id. at 66a-68a).
The court of appeals agreed with the district
court that the amended definition of “personnel”
cured that term’s prior vagueness. Id. at 26a-27a.
The court rejected plaintiffs’ other claims, including
the contention that the statute imposed guilt by
association in violation of the First and Fifth
Amendments, and that the statute should be
narrowly construed to apply only to speech intended
to further an organization’s illegal activities. Id. at
13a-19a; id. at 27a-32a.10
Plaintiffs initially sought to provide a broader range of
humanitarian assistance to the PKK and the LTTE, but
plaintiffs at this stage pursue only their challenge to the
provisions as applied to speech promoting lawful, nonviolent
10

17

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents a narrow, but critically
important, question: does Section 2339B comport
with the Constitution insofar as it criminalizes pure
speech promoting lawful, nonviolent activities – here,
core political speech, including human rights
advocacy and peacemaking? Plaintiffs argue that as
applied to such speech, the statutory prohibitions on
providing “training,” “expert advice or assistance,”
“service,” and “personnel” are unconstitutional
because they are vague, penalize protected speech
and association, and impermissibly discriminate on
the basis of content.
The narrow focus of plaintiffs’ claims in this
Court means that the case does not involve the
propriety of banning financial or other tangible
support to terrorist organizations.
Nor does it
involve speech advocating or teaching criminal or
violent activity.
Plaintiffs here seek only to
safeguard their right to promote lawful, nonviolent
activities through pure speech.
I. The fact that plaintiffs seek to engage in pure
speech, of a political character, advocating only
lawful, nonviolent activities, colors all of the
constitutional analysis here. The right to engage in
peaceable political speech is at the very core of the
First Amendment, and government attempts to
activities, as described by the district court and court of
appeals. Pet. App. 5a n.1; id. at 35a-36a. Plaintiffs read the
injunction affirmed by the court of appeals as limited to
protecting only that speech.
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criminalize such speech warrant the Court’s most
skeptical scrutiny.
II. The challenged provisions are unconstitutionally vague. Criminal prohibitions affecting speech
demand “precision of regulation.” NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). These provisions are the
antithesis of precise. The prohibition on “training,”
for example, requires plaintiffs to distinguish
between “specific skills” and “general knowledge,”
“classic terms of degree” strikingly similar to those
this Court has previously declared unconstitutionally
vague. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S.
1030, 1048-49 (1991). To decide whether their
speech is proscribed as “expert advice,” they must
discern whether it is “derived from” general
knowledge or instead from “scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge” – a distinction likewise
far too uncertain and context-dependent to support
criminal sanctions.
To decide whether an appeal to Congress or the
United Nations is a prohibited “service,” plaintiffs
must distinguish between speaking “on behalf of an
organization,” which the government claims is
permissible, and speaking “for the benefit of” the
organization, which the government contends is a
crime. And to avoid punishment for the provision of
“personnel,” plaintiffs must guess what level of
coordination or association with a designated group
denies them protection for “entirely independent”
activity and triggers the prohibition on acting at an
organization’s “direction.”
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Each of these inquiries, moreover, is further
complicated by the fact that the provisions overlap in
internally contradictory ways. The “training” and
“expert advice” definitions appear to permit teaching
or advice based solely on “general knowledge,” but
such teaching or advice would violate the “service”
prohibition if done for the group’s benefit. The
“personnel” prohibition carves out “entirely
independent” activities, but neither teaching nor
advice could be “entirely independent” by their
nature. Even independent activities would be a
prohibited “service” if done for the organization’s
benefit. Muddying the waters still further, the
government claims that there is an unwritten
exemption for “independent advocacy” that applies
across the whole statute, but would not allow “any
collaboration or other relationship between the giver
and the recipient.” Pet. 22.
The courts below correctly deemed the
prohibitions on “training,” “service,” and “expert
advice or assistance” “derived from specialized
knowledge” impermissibly vague as applied, because
they fail to afford plaintiffs any clear guidance as to
what speech is criminally prohibited. The same
conclusion, however, also holds for the prohibitions
on “personnel” and “expert advice or assistance”
“derived from scientific [or] technical … knowledge.”
All four provisions are therefore impermissibly vague
as applied to plaintiffs’ speech.
Indeed, the
provisions are so vague that they render the statute
facially overbroad, for they appear to penalize not
just plaintiffs’ speech, but virtually all speech
promoting lawful activity when communicated to,
for, or at the direction of a designated group.
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III. Wholly apart from their vagueness, the
challenged provisions are unconstitutional as applied
because they flatly prohibit pure speech promoting
lawful, nonviolent ends, and because they
discriminate on the basis of content. The statute’s
terms draw facially content-based distinctions
between “specific skills” and “general knowledge”;
between “scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge,” and all other knowledge; between
“religious” and nonreligious materials.
As the
government
defines
“service,”
that
term
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. It prohibits
speech “for the benefit of” a designated group, but
permits speech critical of the group.
And the
statute’s penalties expressly turn on whether speech
is associated with a favored or disfavored political
organization. The identical speech on human rights
is permissible if communicated to, for the benefit of,
or at the direction of, the PLO, which has never been
designated, but proscribed if made to, for, or at the
direction of the PKK.
The challenged provisions cannot survive strict
scrutiny.
Prohibitions of pure speech are
presumptively invalid. And “[i]t is rare that a
regulation restricting speech because of its content
will ever be permissible.” United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
While national security is a compelling interest, the
government has not shown that it is necessary to
prohibit speech promoting peaceable, nonviolent
activity to serve that end. Indeed, this Court has
repeatedly ruled that otherwise lawful expression
and association may not be criminalized in order to

21
forestall others from engaging in illegal conduct.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
IV.
The challenged provisions also violate
plaintiffs’ right of association. All four provisions do
so, as noted above, by penalizing speech only when it
is communicated to, for the benefit of, or at the
direction of selectively disfavored organizations. And
the “service” and “personnel” provisions directly
penalize association wholly apart from their
discriminatory application. Virtually any action one
might take in conjunction with a designated
organization could be viewed as done for its “benefit,”
and therefore a prohibited “service.” And if, as the
government maintains, acting in collaboration with a
group forfeits any protection for “independent
advocacy,” the statute directly penalizes association.
Congress may not criminally punish association,
however, absent proof of specific intent to further an
organization’s illegal ends. As interpreted by the
government, the statute contains no such
requirement, and is therefore invalid.
V. The provisions cannot be upheld under the
intermediate scrutiny standard established in United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). O’Brien
applies only to content-neutral regulations of
expressive conduct. It is categorically inapplicable to
statutes that penalize pure speech or association, or
discriminate based on content. In any event, the
provisions would not survive intermediate scrutiny,
as they prohibit vastly more speech than is necessary
to serve any legitimate interest in national security.
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VI. Finally, the Court can avoid all of the
foregoing constitutional questions by interpreting the
statute to require proof of intent to further an
organization’s illegal ends where, as here, pure
speech and association are at stake.
Congress
specified that the statute should not be “construed or
applied” to violate the First Amendment.
Interpreting the statute to require specific intent
where it is applied to pure speech and association
would fully support, on statutory grounds, the
injunctive and declaratory relief plaintiffs seek, and
thereby permit the Court to avoid the constitutional
questions raised here.
This is the same route the Court followed in
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), when it
faced another statute that on its face appeared to
impose wide-ranging penalties on speech and
association because of the illegal ends of a “terrorist
organization.”
The government’s alternative
construction, which would exempt only “independent
advocacy,” would not avoid the constitutional
questions presented here. The First Amendment
protects more than the abstract right to speak
“independently,” but also the right, asserted here, to
speak to others, in association with others, and at
the direction of others.
This Court has warned that even “a state of war
is not a blank check for the President when it comes
to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 536 (plurality). This principle applies to
Congress, too, and has particular importance for the
statute at issue here, which is not limited to times of
emergency or war, or to groups that have attacked
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the United States or Americans. Where, as here,
Congress has expressly directed that its law is not to
be applied in ways that violate the First
Amendment, where no financial or tangible support
is at issue, and where the government has not shown
that criminalizing purely peaceable expression is
necessary to the nation’s security, plaintiffs’
proposed speech must be protected.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS’ INTENDED ACTIVITIES ARE
PURE POLITICAL SPEECH ENTITLED TO
THE
HIGHEST
FIRST
AMENDMENT
PROTECTION

Plaintiffs propose to engage in pure speech
addressing political issues, which this Court has long
held is entitled to the First Amendment’s highest
protection.
The political character of plaintiffs’
speech is clear: they seek to lobby Congress, to teach
and advise on human rights, to promote the peaceful
resolution of political disputes, and to advocate for
the human rights of minority populations
represented by the designated organizations. Pet.
App. 5a n.1; Fertig Declarations, J.A. 91-126.
Congress’s criminalization of such speech as applied
here warrants application of the First Amendment’s
most stringent safeguards.
“[L]awful political speech [is] at the core of what
the First Amendment is designed to protect.”
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003). “Core
political speech occupies the highest, most protected
position” constitutionally accorded to speech. RAV v.
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City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (political speech “is at the heart
of the First Amendment’s protections”).11 Because
political speech warrants such heightened protection,
this Court has stated that “[w]hen a law burdens
core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’
and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n., 514 U.S. 334,
347 (1995) (citation omitted).
Here, plaintiffs’ proposed activities are not only
political but constitute pure speech. They do not
seek protection for conduct engaged in for expressive
purposes, but for speech itself. The Court has
insisted that pure speech warrants the highest
protection, and has refused to apply relaxed scrutiny
to criminal bans on pure expression. See, e.g., Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (treating
conviction for wearing jacket with offensive message
as based on pure speech, and subjecting it to
heightened scrutiny); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (same for conviction
based on “pure expression” under Georgia rape
shield law). See infra, Point V.A.
In considering each of plaintiffs’ legal challenges,
therefore, the fact that the statute as applied here
See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS *421-22 (5th ed. 1883); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (1941); Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 304-07 (G. Stone, R.
Epstein & C. Sunstein eds. 1992).
11
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criminalizes pure political speech must trigger the
Court’s most skeptical review.
II.

THE PROVISIONS ARE VAGUE AS
APPLIED TO PLAINTIFFS’ INTENDED
SPEECH

Congress defined “material support” to reach well
beyond mere financial support and the provision of
tangible goods.
By their terms, and as the
government has interpreted them, the criminal
prohibitions implicate a broad range of pure speech:
“training” in any “specific skill”; “expert advice”;
speaking, writing, or petitioning Congress or the
United Nations “for the benefit of” a designated
group; and coordinating one’s speech with a group in
such a way as to act under its “direction or control.”
These prohibitions fail to offer plaintiffs sufficiently
clear guidance as to whether and to what extent
their proposed speech is in fact prohibited.
A statute is vague if it causes “men of common
intelligence ... necessarily [to] guess at its meaning
and [to] differ as to its application.” Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The
degree of precision required increases with the
gravity of the penalty and the importance of the
rights at stake. Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99
(1982) (higher standard applicable for criminal
statutes and when speech at stake). Under wellsettled law, the material-support provisions at issue
here are subject to the most stringent vagueness
scrutiny for two reasons: they impose severe criminal
sanctions, and they trench on speech and

26
associational rights. Id.; Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997); Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1964).12 All four
provisions require ordinary persons to guess at their
meaning. They fail to draw the clear lines mandated
by the Constitution where speech may trigger
criminal sanctions.
A. Training
The prohibition on “training” requires individuals
to draw impossible distinctions between prohibited
instruction in a “specific skill” and permissible
instruction in “general knowledge.” To determine
whether their proposed teaching of human rights
advocacy or peacemaking is proscribed, for example,
plaintiffs must guess at whether they would be
imparting “specific skills” or merely “general
knowledge.” If they guess wrong, they face up to
fifteen years in prison.

12

In its petition, the government maintained that “the
material-support statute does not regulate speech,” and
therefore does not warrant heightened vagueness scrutiny. Pet.
13. That is simply false. As demonstrated above, all of
plaintiffs’ proposed activities are pure speech. See supra, Point
I. When a statute prohibits “training,” defined as “instruction
or teaching,” “expert advice,” and any advocacy done “for the
benefit” of a designated group or under its “direction or control,”
it directly criminalizes speech. The government conceded as
much in the lower courts, where it admitted that the statutory
provisions would criminalize, among other things, the teaching
of political geography or English, lobbying the United Nations
and Congress, writing amicus briefs, and advocating for a
designated group’s benefit on television or in the print press.
See supra, pp. 12-13; infra, p. 27-28.
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The difficulty is that “general knowledge” and
“specific
skills,”
much
like
“general”
and
“elaborated,” are “classic terms of degree,” and as
such, provide “no principle for determining when …
remarks pass from the safe harbor of the general to
the forbidden sea of the [specific].” Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. at 1048-49 (holding
unconstitutionally vague a state bar rule that
allowed lawyers to make “general” remarks on
pending criminal cases, but barred them from
“elaborating”).
The government’s own attempts to explain the
distinction suffice to establish its inescapable
vagueness. Before the court of appeals, counsel for
the government opined that, under this definition,
teaching geography would be permissible because it
constitutes “general knowledge,” but teaching the
political geography of terrorist organizations would
constitute a banned “specific skill,” as would the
But what if, during a
teaching of English.13
“general” course on geography, a student’s question
prompted a discussion of the political geography of
terrorist organizations? What if the course included
a session on the science of geography, or the
The colloquy took place during the en banc oral argument,
at approximately 49 minutes into the argument. See Recording
of En Banc Oral Argument, Dec. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=00
00004506. At the time of oral argument, Congress had passed
the 2004 amendments, but President Bush had not yet signed
them into law. See Statement by President George W. Bush
Upon Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2985 (Dec.
17, 2004). Government counsel nonetheless addressed the new
law’s definitions in the colloquy above.
13
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geography of a specific region incorporating
statistical information? An ordinary person could
only hazard a guess as to whether these are
impermissible “specific skills,” or permissible aspects
of “general knowledge.”
In the district court, government counsel
similarly illustrated the profound difficulty of
understanding
the
“training”
prohibition.
Defendants asserted in their brief that plaintiffs
were free to advocate “on behalf of” the PKK before
the United Nations or “any forum of their choosing,”
even though they simultaneously asserted that any
activity done “for the benefit of” a designated group
would be a proscribed “service.” Govt. Mem. in Supp.
of S.J. at 17 n.8, 21 (July 17, 2005). When the
district court at oral argument asked whether
plaintiffs could lobby the U.N. on the PKK’s behalf,
government counsel first said that they could do so.
D. Ct. Tr. 7-8, C.A. Supplemental Excerpts of Record
(SER) 218-19.
When the court asked whether
plaintiffs could meet with members of the PKK to
discuss a strategy for lobbying the U.N., and then
divide up into groups to carry it out, however,
counsel opined that such conduct “presumably could”
constitute prohibited “training,” D. Ct. Tr. 11, C.A.
SER 220, and minutes later stated that it “clearly
comes within the proscriptions against training and
expert advice or assistance.” D. Ct. Tr. 15; C.A. SER
224. At the close of the colloquy, the district court
concluded, “I don’t know how you think anyone, a
normal person, would figure this out based on this
exchange.” D. Ct. Tr. 19, C.A. SER 228.
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B. Expert Advice or Assistance
The ban on providing “expert advice or
assistance” is vague for many of the same reasons.
It, too, directly criminalizes speech, and forces
plaintiffs to guess whether any aspect of their advice
could be said to “derive[] from scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge.” The vagueness infects
the entire prohibition, not just the “specialized
knowledge” component.
Notably, the statute requires individuals to
determine, not simply whether their speech is itself
“technical,” “scientific,” or “specialized,” but, even
more ambiguously, whether its content in any way
“derives from” scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.
Virtually all knowledge
might be thought to derive from scientific, technical,
or some other specialized knowledge, yet Congress
plainly intended some limit. The statute provides no
coherent or reliable way to make the distinction.
The courts below correctly invalidated the
“specialized knowledge” portion. Like “general” and
“elaboration,” “specialized” is a “classic term of
degree,” and fails to afford notice of what is
prohibited. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-49. Judge
Fertig could not risk providing advice about
presenting human rights claims to the United
Nations unless he was certain that his advice was
derived from “general knowledge” and included no
statement informed by “specialized knowledge.” But
how does one distinguish which aspects of human
rights derive from general as opposed to specialized
knowledge? And because providing advice generally
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involves a conversation, how can one know whether
one’s responses to questions might stray into a
subject that could be said to be “derived from …
specialized knowledge” (or, for that matter,
“scientific [or] technical” knowledge)? A large share
(perhaps most) of general knowledge consists of
“specialized knowledge” that has come to be widely
known, so is literally “derived from” specialized
knowledge. How are plaintiffs to tell the difference?
Having correctly deemed the ban on advice
“derived from … specialized knowledge” to be
unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiffs’
speech, the courts below erroneously upheld the ban
on advice “derived from scientific [or] technical …
knowledge.” No sound rationale supports the latter
conclusion. Indeed, the court of appeals proffered no
rationale, but merely cited two sources indicating
that “technical” and “scientific method” are fifthgrade and third-grade level vocabulary words,
respectively. Pet. App. 24a.
This misconceives the duty of a court in assessing
a vagueness challenge. The question is not whether
the terms are widely known, but whether they
provide sufficient notice of what is prohibited in the
context of a criminal law trenching on First
Amendment rights. Many words on grammar school
vocabulary lists would not pass that test, or even
more lenient tests of vagueness. See Coates v.
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (declaring vague a
city ordinance banning “annoying” behavior).
“Monstrous,” “tremendous,” “awesome,” “incredible,”
“intense,” and “dreadful” are all on a third-grade
vocabulary list, but would hardly be permissible
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terms to specify prohibited activity in a criminal
statute.14 Indeed, the word “specializes,” which the
court rightly deemed vague (in the form,
“specialized”), is on one of the fourth grade lists from
the same source the court cited.15
The “expert advice” prohibition leaves citizens
without meaningful guidance, and gives prosecutors
and juries broad discretion to target unpopular
speech. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 10809 (1972). In one common usage, what knowledge is
“technical” or “specialized” will depend entirely on
what one’s assumed audience already knows or
remembers or how much effort will be required to
take it in. High school algebra, for example, might
be “technical” or “specialized” for one audience, but
“general knowledge” for another. So, too, speech
addressing human rights, lobbying, or public
relations could be deemed to involve “general
knowledge” or instead to derive from “technical” and
“specialized”
knowledge,
depending
on
the
sophistication of the audience. Speech that might or
might not be proscribed based on its potential effect
on a listener is clearly vague, for the speaker has no
way of gauging listeners’ reactions. See Federal
Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc.,
551 U.S. 449, 494-95 (2007).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(1993) defines “technical” to mean, inter alia: (1)
“having special us[ually] practical knowledge
14
Houghton Mifflin Reading Spelling and Vocabulary Word
Lists, www-kes.stjohns.k12.fl.us/wordlists/3rd/vocab3.htm.
15

Id., www-kes.stjohns.k12.fl.us/wordlists/4th/vocab5.htm.
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especially of a mechanical or scientific subject,” (2)
“marked by or characteristic of specialization,” (3) “of
or relating to a particular subject,” and (4) “of or
relating to technique.” Id. at 2348. It defines
“specialized” to mean, inter alia, “designed or fitted for
use or employment in one special line (as of
occupation).” Id. at 2186. Virtually all advice could
be said to “derive” from knowledge relating to a
“particular
subject,”
“technique,”
“line,”
or
“occupation.” Congress meant to excise something
when it carved out advice derived from nonspecialized knowledge, but the language it employed
offers little guidance.
“Scientific” also leaves vast room for uncertainty.
The term means “of, relating to, or used in science.”
Id. at 2032. “Science,” in turn, means, inter alia: (1)
“possession of knowledge as distinguished from
ignorance or misunderstanding,” (2) “a branch or
department of systematized knowledge that is or can
be made a specific object of study;” or (3) “knowledge
classified and made available in work, life, or the
search for truth.” Id. Debates rage about when, or
the extent to which, disciplines have become
“scientific” (economics? psychology? geography?
political science?).
Would advice on presenting
torture claims to a human rights tribunal be barred
because assessing whether someone has been the
victim of torture may in part derive from “scientific”
or “technical” knowledge? Would advice for peace
negotiations that addressed such issues as allocation
of natural resources, energy use, transportation, or
voting and representational arrangements be barred
as derived from scientific or technical knowledge?

33
The government has defended the statutory
definition by noting its similarity to the definition of
“expert testimony” under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Pet. 15. But here, as elsewhere
in the law, “context matters.” Gonzales v. O Centro
Espiritu Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
431 (2006); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327
(2003). That a particular standard may suffice as a
guide to discretionary judgment calls made by
trained judges (who do not risk going to jail for a
mistake) does not mean that it can be imposed on the
general public on pain of fifteen years’ imprisonment.
See Pet. App. 66a (finding that Rule 702 “does not
clarify the term ... for the average person with no
background in the law”). It cannot seriously be
doubted that a statute making it a crime to publish
anything derived from “scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge” would be unconstitutionally
vague – just as would a statute making it a crime to
publish information whose prejudicial or confusing
character outweighed its probative value, even
though that, too, is a standard routinely applied by
judges. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Moreover, the “expert advice or assistance”
definition is radically more open-ended than Rule
702. It requires citizens to guess not only at what
constitutes scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge, but at what is “derived” from such
knowledge, an even more capacious and ambiguous
category.
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C. Service
The most expansive provision in the definition of
“material support” is the prohibition on providing
any “service” to a designated group, which Congress
added in 2004 without supplying a definition. The
courts below correctly held this prohibition
unconstitutionally vague, as it provides literally no
guidance as to what speech is prohibited or
permitted.
Citing a dictionary, the government maintains
that the term prohibits any “act done for the benefit
... of another.” Pet. 17. But how does one determine
whether a speech, for example, about the human
rights of Kurds is done “for the benefit of” the PKK?
What about a letter to the State Department
objecting to the detention on political grounds of a
PKK member?
When the New York Times,
Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times published
op-ed essays by Hamas spokespersons in the past
two years, were they violating the law by providing a
“service” to a designated group?16

See Mousa Abu Marzook, Hamas Speaks, L.A. Times, Jan.
6, 2009, at A15 (by deputy of the political bureau of Hamas);
Mahmoud al-Zahar, No Peace Without Hamas, Wash. Post, Apr.
17, 2008, at A23 (by founder of Hamas and foreign minister in
Hamas led government); Ahmed Yousef, What Hamas Wants,
N.Y. Times, June 20, 2007, at A19 (by political adviser to
Hamas leader Ismaiel Haniya); Ahmed Yousef, Engage With
Hamas, We Earned Our Support, Wash. Post, June 20, 2007, at
A19. Hamas is a designated “foreign terrorist organization.”
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
16
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At the same time that the government contends
that “service” prohibits anything done “for the
benefit of” a designated group, it also contends that
advocating “on behalf of the PKK” is permitted (so
long as one also avoids acting at “the direction of” the
proscribed group, which would constitute the
provision of “personnel”). Govt. Mem. in Supp. of
S.J. at 17 n.8; see also D. Ct. Tr. 7; C.A. SER 218.
Thus, Judge Fertig and the HLP must attempt to
distinguish between speaking “on behalf of” the
PKK, which is assertedly permissible, and speaking
“for the benefit of” the PKK, which is a crime. The
government has yet to explain how speech on an
organization’s behalf would not also be for its benefit.
Yet a fifteen-year criminal sentence could turn on
the distinction.
The “service” prohibition also forces individuals to
guess whether joining or affiliating with a group is
prohibited. Before the “service” prohibition was
added in 2004, the government represented that
citizens were free under the material-support statute
to join designated groups, and that concession was
critical to the court of appeals’ rejection of plaintiffs’
right-of-association challenge. Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir.
2000)
(rejecting
First
Amendment
right-ofassociation challenge because the statute permits
membership and affiliation with foreign terrorist
organizations). But with the statute’s new ban on
“service,” membership and affiliation are now in
doubt. A reasonable person could readily understand
any joining or affiliating with a political organization
to be “for [its] benefit.” How can one distinguish
between ostensibly permitted membership and
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association, on the one hand, and “service,” on the
other? Such confusion is intolerable where, as here,
criminal prosecution for activities protected by the
First Amendment is at stake.
D. Personnel
Two separate panels of the court of appeals
unanimously held that the statute’s original ban on
providing “personnel” criminalized protected speech
and was unconstitutionally vague. See supra, note 9.
After Congress amended the provision in 2004 to
limit “personnel” to persons acting under a recipient
organization’s “direction or control,” while exempting
“entirely independent” activity, the court held that
the “personnel” ban sufficiently apprises individuals
of the proscribed zone. Pet. App. 26a-27a.
The amended definition of “personnel,” however,
continues to leave the statute’s reach intolerably
vague. “Direction or control” could mean many
things of potential, but uncertain, applicability to the
speech plaintiffs propose. The fact that Congress
drafted a narrow exception only for “entirely
independent” activity leaves citizens wondering
whether the prohibition covers all or just some parts
of the vast gray area between complete control and
complete independence, encompassing myriad forms
of coordination, collaboration, consultation, and
communication.
For example, what if Judge Fertig offered his
legal services to work with the PKK in presenting a
human rights petition to the U.N.? A lawyer might
well be said to act under the “direction” of his client,
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as, subject only to professional obligations, the
client’s wishes are controlling. But when this very
issue arose in the prosecution of a lawyer under the
“personnel” provision, the government opined that a
lawyer acting as “house counsel” would be acting
impermissibly under the organization’s “direction or
control,” but an outside counsel doing the same work
could be seen as “independent.” United States v.
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
The court in Sattar concluded that such distinctions
were too unclear to pass muster, and declared the
“personnel” ban unconstitutionally vague. Id.17
If plaintiffs wanted to write an op-ed essay
defending the PKK and criticizing its designation as
“terrorist,” would coordinating the drafting with a
PKK leader constitute criminal acceptance of
“direction”? A reasonable person might fear that
such collaboration would negate a claim that the
essay was written “entirely independently.” What if
the author accepted three of the leader’s five
editorial suggestions, or only two? What if the
author coordinated with the PKK the timing of the
essay’s submission for publication? Any coordination
at all might risk prosecution.
For related reasons, the “personnel” provision is
vague with respect to associational rights. It does
The Sattar case preceded the 2004 amendment to the
“personnel” prohibition, but the government in that case
maintained that the “personnel” prohibition should be
construed as limited to action under a designated group’s
“direction or control.” See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
Government counsel’s explication therefore remains relevant to
the meaning of the amended statute, which expressly adopted
the “direction or control” limitation.
17
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not provide an adequate distinction between
membership in or affiliation with a designated group,
which the government has said the statute permits,
cf. HLP I, 205 F.3d at 1134, and providing the group
with “personnel,” which is a crime. In the Sattar
case, the government was unable to articulate any
coherent distinction between the two actions:
When asked at oral argument how to
distinguish being a member of an organization
from being a quasi-employee, the government
initially responded “You know it when you see
it.” ... While such a standard was once an
acceptable way for a Supreme Court Justice to
identify obscenity, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring), it
is an insufficient guide by which a person can
predict the legality of that person’s conduct. See
United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 104
(2d Cir. 2002) (“It is not enough to say that
judges can intuit the scope of the prohibition if
[the defendants] could not.”)
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359-60. The amended
definition does nothing to clarify how one can
associate with a designated group without acting in
some respect under its “direction or control.”
Plaintiffs reasonably fear that any affiliation or
collaboration may render them criminally liable.
E.

The Interaction of the Provisions
Exacerbates Their Vagueness

The confusion generated by each of the above
prohibitions is exacerbated by their interaction. The
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provisions,
read
together,
are
hopelessly
contradictory, or at least their collective meaning is
so muddled as to leave would-be speakers uncertain
about what is forbidden. Similar contradictions have
supported invalidation for lack of constitutionally
required fair notice even when speech was not at
issue. See, e.g., United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S.
174, 176-77 (1952); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438
(1959).
For example, the “service” prohibition appears to
conflict with the narrowing limitations Congress
simultaneously placed in the definitions of
“training,” “expert advice,” and “personnel.”
Teaching a subject of “general knowledge” or
providing advice derived from non-specialized
knowledge is expressly carved out of the “training”
and “expert advice” provisions, but if done “for the
benefit of” a designated group it would appear to be
prohibited as a service. (Indeed, what training or
advice would not be done “for the benefit of” the
group?)
Similarly, the “personnel” definition
exempts acts done “entirely independently of the …
organization to advance its goals or objectives,” 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(h), but such activity could reasonably
be thought to be “for the benefit of” the organization,
and therefore simultaneously proscribed by the
“service” prohibition.
Congress specifically provided that the statute
should not be construed or applied to outlaw
protected speech, id. § 2339B(i), but publishing an
article praising the humanitarian work of a
designated organization to improve its reputation
would be simultaneously protected speech and
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presumably a service done “for the benefit of” the
organization. Is it, then, criminal or not? One can
only guess.
Likewise, training or legal advice on a subject of
“general knowledge” would presumably not be a
crime under the definitions of “training” and “expert
advice,” but would be a crime if its provision involved
coordination with the group that amounted to acting
under its direction.
Navigating through the internally contradictory
signals of these overlapping provisions is simply
impossible.
Reading the provisions together, a
would-be speaker would find it a mystery what
Congress thought it was prohibiting and permitting.
F.

The Government’s Defense of the
Challenged Provisions Fails to Account
for the Fact that They Criminalize Pure
Speech

Rather than attempt to answer the many
questions raised about the meaning of the challenged
terms, the government in its petition merely cited
inapposite examples from contexts where First
Amendment interests and/or criminal penalties were
not at stake. Pet. 13-18. But as noted above,
vagueness standards are at their most demanding
when a criminal prohibition affects speech. Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. at 871-72.
Many of the cases the government cited do not even
address vagueness, and all arise from non-speech or
non-criminal contexts that tolerate more lenient
vagueness standards – determining an appropriate
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attorney’s fee (Pet. 15),18 admitting expert evidence
in court (Pet. 16),19 prohibiting the overseas transfer
of money (Pet. 17)20 or heavy equipment (Pet. 18),21
or noncriminal regulation of public employees’
speech (Pet. 14).22 These cases have no bearing on
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988), involved
the standards employed for awarding statutory attorneys’ fees.
It presented no vagueness challenge, and did not involve a
criminal statute at all, much less a prohibition of speech.

18

Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149
(1999), did not address any vagueness issue, and as noted
above, involved the very different setting of evidentiary
standards for judicial governance of a trial.

19

United States v. Homa Int’l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144,
146 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that transferring money for a fee
was undeniably a service, where no issues of speech were
raised).
20

United States v. Hescorp, Heavy Equip. Sales Corp., 801
F.2d 70, 73-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986),
upheld a conviction for shipping construction equipment to Iran
in violation of a complete ban on such transactions. No speech
or associational rights were at stake. Defendants made what
the court characterized as a “tortured” argument that a
separate provision of the statute, governing “service contracts,”
should be construed to create a loophole permitting what the
statute plainly forbade. The court rejected that interpretation
as wholly inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute’s
flat ban, and accordingly also rejected defendants’ related
argument that the statute, as they had tortuously construed it,
was unconstitutionally vague.

21

The government’s one cited authority involving speech is
California Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141
(9th Cir. 2001). There, the court rejected a facial vagueness
challenge to a law that required public school teachers to use
English predominantly in their instruction. In that context,
involving the somewhat curtailed speech interests of public
employees in public schools and no apparent criminal penalties,

22
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plaintiffs’ challenge, which tests the validity of terms
used to criminalize pure political speech. In the
present setting, the demand for clarity is at its
zenith, because otherwise citizens will be forced to
steer clear of anything approaching the prohibited
zone, and free speech will be the loser. That the
statutes at issue have deterred plaintiffs for so long
from providing training and assistance in human
rights and peacemaking, and from advocating on
behalf of disadvantaged ethnic minorities, illustrates
that the dangers of vague prohibitions are all too
real.
G.

The Provisions Are Overbroad Because
Their Application to a Substantial
Amount of Speech Is Unclear

For the foregoing reasons, the provisions at issue
are vague as applied to plaintiffs’ proposed speech.
The same arguments also support a broader
conclusion, namely, that the vagueness of the terms
as applied to all speech renders the provisions
facially invalid.
While there is undoubtedly a small fraction of
pure speech that could constitutionally be prohibited,
such as incitement to crime, the statute makes no
attempt to limit its application to such speech.
Instead, it prohibits all speech that constitutes
the court explained that the law made clear that “instruction”
was tied to the “curriculum,” and on that basis found no
substantial number of instances where there would be doubt
about when English had to be used (for classroom presentation
of the curriculum), and when it did not (in private
conversations with students and parents).
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“training,” “expert advice,” “service,” or “personnel.”
These provisions are profoundly unclear in what they
prohibit, not just as applied to plaintiffs’ proposed
speech, but as applied to a seemingly limitless range
of teaching, advice, and advocacy of lawful activity,
all of which is constitutionally protected. See infra,
Point III. The vagueness of the provisions as applied
to this wide variety of speech renders the statute
substantially overbroad on its face; indeed, the
apparent prohibitions of protected speech dwarf their
application to unprotected speech. See United States
v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008) (noting that
“in the First Amendment context, [we] permit[]
plaintiffs to argue that a statute is overbroad
because it is unclear whether it regulates a
substantial amount of protected speech”); Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
III.

THE
CHALLENGED
PROVISIONS
IMPERMISSIBLY CRIMINALIZE PURE
SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATE ON THE
BASIS OF CONTENT

The challenged provisions independently violate
the First Amendment because they impermissibly
criminalize pure political speech advocating lawful,
nonviolent activity, and discriminate on the basis of
the speech’s content.23 Throughout this litigation,
Plaintiffs argued below that the material-support statute
as a whole, as well as the specific provisions at issue here, were
invalid as applied and on their face because they were contentbased and overbroad penalties on speech, and because they
imposed guilt by association, in violation of the First and Fifth
Amendments. The court of appeals rejected those contentions.
Plaintiffs have preserved the arguments, and they are
independent bases for affirming the injunction below, and for
23
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the government has never cited, and we are unaware
of, any authority from this Court upholding such
blanket criminalization of pure political speech that
seeks to further only lawful, nonviolent activities.
Three features of the challenged provisions as
applied here are critical to the First Amendment
analysis. First, as noted above, plaintiffs’ proposed
speech is pure political speech. See supra, Point I.
Human rights advocacy, peacemaking, petitioning
for redress of grievances, and advocacy on behalf of
ethnic minorities are at the core of what the First
Amendment protects.
Second, the challenged provisions impose a
complete criminal prohibition on such speech. The
challenged provisions do not constitute a zoning
regulation, a regulation of the time, place, or manner
of speech, or a regulation of conduct – expressive or
otherwise. Rather, they work a complete ban of
certain kinds of constitutionally protected speech.
Third, the provisions discriminate based on
content, favoring or disfavoring speech depending on
whether it imparts “specific skills” or “general
knowledge,” is “for the benefit of” a group, or consists
of “religious materials” or non-religious materials.
And all of the provisions selectively prohibit speech
only when it is communicated to, at the direction of,
or for the benefit of particular political organizations.
These factors trigger the most stringent scrutiny,
and the provisions manifestly fail that scrutiny.

expanding it as plaintiffs request in their cross-petition.
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A.

Strict Scrutiny Applies Because the
Challenged
Provisions
Criminally
Proscribe Pure Political Speech

Despite the use of the term “material support,” 18
U.S.C. § 2339B is not limited to barring financial
support, tangible goods, and the like. Rather, its
criminal sanctions extend to pure speech itself. And
according to the government, the statute’s
prohibitions reach even speech that is designed to
discourage terrorism and to promote only lawful,
nonviolent activities. Only a “‘need … of the highest
order’” can justify “a regulation of pure speech.”
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532, 526; Cox Broadcasting,
420 U.S. at 495 (applying strict scrutiny to statute
penalizing “pure expression”); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. at 18-19 (applying strict scrutiny to
conviction for pure expression).
The fact that the statute imposes a complete
criminal ban rather than a time, place, or manner
regulation underscores the need for exacting
scrutiny. This Court has applied more relaxed
scrutiny to laws that impose content-neutral
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech,
but do not criminalize it altogether. See, e.g., Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1999)
(upholding restriction on volume of speech in public
park as “time, place, or manner” regulation where it
was content-neutral and left open ample alternative
avenues for expression). The provisions challenged
here criminalize plaintiffs’ speech altogether, thereby
triggering the First Amendment’s most skeptical
scrutiny. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
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535 U.S. 425, 443 (2002) (plurality) (“[A]n ordinance
warrants intermediate scrutiny only if it is a time,
place, and manner regulation and not a ban.”); id. at
445 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (same).
Here, the statute flatly bans certain kinds of
speech to designated organizations, e.g., training of
or advising their members. Such a ban on speech to
a chosen audience, indeed willing listeners, triggers
Similarly,
strict First Amendment scrutiny.24
nothing less than strict scrutiny can apply to a law
that criminally punishes, as a “service” or provision
of “personnel,” speech advocating peaceable
nonviolent activity that is delivered for a designated
organization’s benefit, or under its direction. See De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), discussed infra
pp. 53-55.
The fact that the statute reaches speech that
implicates foreign affairs does not reduce the need
for stringent First Amendment review. Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down regulation
barring demonstrations that criticized foreign
governments within 500 feet of a foreign embassy).
Political speech is central to self-government,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and selfgovernment includes foreign as well as domestic
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S.
364, 384 (1984) (ban on editorializing denies “the right to
address their chosen audience on matters of public importance”)
(emphasis added); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 335 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (a law
“that would allow a speaker to say anything he chooses, so long
as his intended audience could not hear him,” would be
“unconstitutional under any known First Amendment theory”).
24
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affairs. International communications are a central
aspect of the robust public debate that the First
Amendment is designed to protect.
Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (protecting
First Amendment rights of Americans to receive
Communist literature from abroad).
B.

Strict Scrutiny Applies Because the
Provisions Discriminate on the Basis of
Content

Laws that discriminate on the basis of content,
even if they do not impose criminal bans, also trigger
the Court’s most stringent scrutiny. “A statute is
presumptively
inconsistent
with
the
First
Amendment” if it discriminates against “speakers
because of the content of their speech.” Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); see
also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“Since [the law] is a
content-based speech restriction, it can stand only if
it satisfies strict scrutiny.”).
“[W]hether a statute is content neutral or content
based is something that can be determined on the
face of it; if the statute describes speech by its
content, then it is content based.” Alameda Books,
535 U.S. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring); FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364,
383 (1984) (finding ban on “editorializing” contentbased because authorities “must necessarily examine
the content of the message that is conveyed to
determine whether the views expressed” are
proscribed).
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Most of the challenged provisions discriminate on
the basis of content in obvious ways. The “training”
ban prohibits instruction or teaching where its
content consists of imparting “specific skills,” but not
“general knowledge.” Cf. Arkansas Writers’ Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (state law
that imposed tax on “general interest” magazines but
not professional, trade, sports, and religious
magazines was content-based). The “expert advice”
ban criminalizes the giving of advice only when its
content “derives from scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.” And the “service” ban, as
the government reads it, prohibits speech expressed
“for the benefit of” a designated group, but not
speech that criticizes the group. At the same time,
the statute expressly favors speech with religious
content,
permitting
unlimited
donations
of
“religious” but not secular materials. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b) (exempting “medicine or religious
materials” from the material-support ban).
All the challenged provisions, moreover, including
the “personnel” provision, discriminate in an
additional way. They punish speakers for speech
communicated to, for the benefit of, or directed by
certain organizations but not others, with the
government making the selection based on
inherently political assessments about whether a
group’s activities are consistent with United States
“foreign policy” or “economic interests.” Just as
statutes that discriminate against selected speakers
are suspect,25 so, too, is the discrimination as to a
See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999) (government cannot

25
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speaker’s chosen audience, beneficiary, or director
here. This is a form of content discrimination: speech
to, for the benefit of, or under the direction of the
PKK is treated as pro-PKK, and therefore
criminalized, whereas otherwise-comparable speech
to, for the benefit of, or under the direction of the
PLO, no matter how pro-PLO, is allowed.26
Just as a law banning speech to or for the benefit
of the Republican Party while permitting the same
speech to or for the benefit of the Democratic Party
would be content-based, so, too, is a law that selects
the PKK, LTTE, and other groups from among
countless similar organizations around the world on
restrict advertising for private casinos while allowing
advertising for tribal casinos); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1983) (a
tax that “singled out the press for special treatment” is
unconstitutional); Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“we have frequently condemned …
discrimination among different users of the same medium for
expression.”); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 (“In the realm of
protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified
from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and
the speakers who may address a public issue.”) (citing Mosley,
408 U.S. at 96).
Government counsel made this content-discriminatory
purpose clear at oral argument before the court of appeals.
Asked whether filing an amicus brief on behalf of the LTTE in
this case would be a crime, counsel replied, “Yes because
Congress wants these organizations to be radioactive. … We
don’t want U.S. lawyers, other U.S. persons, to be saying, ‘Yeah,
I want to help them in a good way,’ because that adds to the
goodwill and the standing of the organization.” C.A. Oral
Argument Tape, supra note 7, at 34:30. The government’s
concern, in other words, is with speech that sends a message
that a disfavored organization is legitimate and deserves
goodwill.
26
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expressly political grounds, and then proscribes
speech that sends messages that promote those
groups’ “goodwill.” See supra, note 26.
The government argues that the statute is
content-neutral because it is motivated by the
legitimate purpose of deterring terrorist activity.
Pet. 19-20. But the asserted legitimacy of the
government’s motive does not change the fact that
the statute contains provisions that are contentbased on their face. A law that banned all speech
praising terrorism would indisputably be contentbased, even if it were motivated by the same purpose
of deterring terrorist activity. The “assertion of a
content neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law
which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”
Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 642 (1994); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 117
(“[I]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a
violation of the First Amendment”).27

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), does not alter this
conclusion. In Hill, the Court upheld a law that regulated the
manner in which speakers could approach individuals within
100 feet of a health care facility. The Court viewed the law as a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, emphasizing
that it was content-neutral, only regulated the manner in which
speech could be expressed to unwilling listeners, and left ample
alternative channels for communication. Id. at 719-30. Over
dissents, the majority deemed the statutory language,
addressing “oral protest, education, or counseling,” as
equivalent to a neutral regulation of “picketing.” Id. at 721.
Here, by contrast, the challenged provisions impose a complete
ban, not a regulation of the manner of speech, and the ban is
expressly content-based. Indeed, in over ten years of litigation,
the government has never even sought to defend the challenged
provisions as a “time, place, or manner” regulation.

27
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C.

The Challenged Provisions
Survive Strict Scrutiny

Cannot

“When a law burdens core political speech, we
apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the
restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). Content-based
laws may be upheld only where the government
establishes that the particular content distinctions
drawn are “the least restrictive means” to further a
compelling state interest. Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
Importantly, the Court has repeatedly held that pure
political speech like plaintiffs’, advocating peaceable,
nonviolent ends, may not be criminalized in order to
forestall others from engaging in illegal conduct,
even where that illegal conduct threatens national
security.
While combating terrorism is undoubtedly a
compelling state interest, the government has not
shown that criminalizing pure political speech
advocating peaceful, lawful activities is necessary to
further that interest. Nor has it pointed to anything
in the legislative record – in 1996, in 2001, or in 2004
– that reflects a specific congressional focus on such
speech, let alone a determination that banning it is
necessary or, even, advisable. The congressional
expressions of concern to protect speech suggest the
contrary. See Statement, supra, p. 7. There is
simply no evidence in the litigation or legislative
records to show that criminally proscribing speech
promoting peaceable, lawful conduct will further the
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interest in reducing terrorist activity at all, much
less that it is necessary to do so.
In defending the statute’s prohibitions on
financial support, the government below relied on
the notion that money is “fungible,” so that support
for lawful activities might free up resources that the
recipient organization can use for terrorist activity.
But that theory, about money, has no application to
the speech at issue in this as-applied challenge.
Indeed, the 1996 congressional “finding” that the
government relies upon is by its terms limited to
“contributions.” See Statement, supra, p. 7. And if
the finding were applied to speech advocating lawful,
nonviolent activity, it would deserve no deference, as
it lacks any evidentiary support. See Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 530-31 & n.17 (dismissing congressional
finding advanced to support statute criminalizing
speech because “the relevant factual foundation is
not to be found in the legislative record”).
More importantly, the Court has repeatedly
rejected the proposition that otherwise-lawful speech
may be prohibited in order to deter criminal conduct
by a third party. In Bartnicki, for example, the
Court held unconstitutional a civil statute that
penalized the publication of illegally intercepted cell
phone conversations as applied to an individual who
had obtained the communications legally (from
someone else who had illegally intercepted them).
The Court rejected the government’s attempt to
justify the statute on the ground that it would deter
illegal interceptions by others: “It would be quite
remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding
possessor of information can be suppressed in order
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to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”
Id. at 529-30.
Similarly, plaintiffs’ speech,
advocating only lawful, nonviolent activities, cannot
be proscribed on the basis of mere speculation that
such a prohibition might somehow deter the PKK or
the LTTE from engaging in terrorist activity.
Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Court struck down a federal
statute banning “virtual child pornography,” and
rejected the government’s argument that the
restriction was necessary because such materials
might be used to seduce children, or might increase
demand for child pornography using actual children.
As the Court explained, “the government may not
prohibit speech because it increases the chance an
unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite
future time.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam)). Here, as in
Free Speech Coalition, “the harm does not
necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon
some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal
acts.” Id. at 250.
This principle dates back to some of the Court’s
earliest First Amendment decisions. In De Jonge v.
United States, 299 U.S. 353, the Court invalidated a
conviction under a criminal syndicalism statute of an
individual who spoke on behalf of the Communist
Party at a meeting held under Party auspices, at
which he sought to recruit members to the Party.
The Court accepted that the Party engaged in illegal
activities, and that De Jonge acted under the Party’s
auspices, but held that he could not be convicted
because he advocated only “peaceable” activity. Id.
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at 365. The Court noted that if individuals are
“engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace
and order, they may be prosecuted for their
conspiracy.” Id. But, the Court continued, “it is a
different matter when the State, instead of
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere
participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful
public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.”
Id.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at
908-09, 932-34, the Court relied on De Jonge to hold
that the leader of and participants in an economic
boycott could not be held liable for illegal violence
that attended the boycott absent proof that they
engaged in or directly incited the violence. Id. at 928
(“[W]hen an advocate’s] appeals do not incite lawless
action, they must be regarded as protected speech.”).
Even where speech directly advocates criminal
conduct, the Court has held that it may not be
penalized unless it is in fact intended and likely to
produce “imminent lawless action.” Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. at 108-09 (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits application of a disorderly conduct statute
to pure speech that, while advocating illegal activity,
did not incite it). If the government is not permitted
to penalize direct advocacy of illegal activity except
in circumstances where it constitutes incitement to
imminent crime, surely it cannot criminalize
plaintiffs’ proposed speech, which promotes only
lawful, peaceful activities, and does not urge
criminal conduct of any kind.
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The government will not be deprived of its
considerable arsenal of legal tools to combat
terrorism if the limited provisions at issue here are
invalidated as applied to speech advocating
peaceable, nonviolent action.
Indeed, given
Congress’s statement that the material-support
statute may not be “construed or applied” in ways
that violate the First Amendment, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(i), it is doubtful that Congress even intended
to criminalize such speech. See infra, Point VI.
Plaintiffs’ requested relief would leave the statute in
place, to be employed against those providing
material support in the form of financial aid and
other non-speech support, as well as against those
whose speech is unprotected.
In addition, the
government would still be able to invoke other laws
to prosecute those who support terrorist activity,
conspire to engage in terrorist activity, or aid or abet
The government has made no
such activity.28
showing that any successful prosecution under
§ 2339B would have been prevented if speech
advocating lawful, nonviolent activity were
protected.
In short, the government has utterly failed to
meet its heavy burden of justification under strict
scrutiny.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (prohibiting material support
of terrorist crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (prohibiting financing of
terrorism with knowledge that the funds will be used for
specific offenses); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2
(aiding and abetting); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy).
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IV.

THE
CHALLENGED
PROVISIONS
VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

The challenged provisions also violate the right of
association. As discussed above, the challenged
provisions penalize speech only when it is
communicated to, for the benefit of, or under the
direction or control of disfavored associations. See
supra, Point III.B. This association-based trigger for
penalizing speech violates the First and Fifth
Amendments.
In addition, the “service” and
“personnel” provisions directly penalize association
because, as noted above, the mere act of joining or
associating with a group could be viewed as
benefiting the group or acting at the group’s
“direction.” See supra, Point II.C-D.
This Court has confronted similar penalties
triggered
by
association
with
disfavored
organizations before.
In the 1950s, Congress
imposed analogous restrictions on the Communist
Party, after expressly finding that it was a foreigndominated organization that used terrorism and
other illegal means in seeking to overthrow the
United States by force and violence.29 This Court did
not question Congress’s findings regarding the
Communist Party’s illegal ends and terrorist means,
but nonetheless insisted that the First and Fifth
Congress found that there “exists a world Communist
movement … whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit,
infiltration … espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other
means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian
dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through the
medium of a world-wide Communist organization.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 781 (West 1991) (repealed 1993), quoted in Aptheker v. Sec’y of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 n.8 (1964).
29
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Amendments precluded any penalty for association
with the Communist Party unless an individual
specifically intended to further its unlawful ends.30
De
Jonge
v.
Oregon,
discussed
above,
demonstrates that the principle fully applies to
active association with organizations engaged in
illegal activity.
The Court there unanimously
reversed De Jonge’s conviction for his active
participation in a gathering held under the
Communist Party’s auspices, because De Jonge’s
activities did not promote illegal conduct:
[P]eaceable assembly for lawful discussion
cannot be made a crime.
The holding of
meetings for peaceable political action cannot
be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct
of such meetings cannot be branded as
criminals on that score. The question, if the
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly
are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices
under which the meeting is held but as to its
purpose.
See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967)
(holding that the government could not ban Communist Party
members from working in defense facilities absent proof that
they had specific intent to further the Party’s unlawful ends);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (“[m]ere
knowing membership without a specific intent to further the
unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally
adequate basis” for barring employment in state university
system to Communist Party members); Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961) (applying same principle to
criminal statute).
The same principle applies to other
organizations. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at
920.
30
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299 U.S. at 365. See also NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908-09 (relying on De Jonge
to hold that those who participated in the lawful
aspects of an economic boycott could not be held
liable for injuries caused by illegal, violent aspects of
the boycott).
Here, as in De Jonge, plaintiffs seek to engage in
lawful peaceable speech and association.
The
challenged provisions criminalize their speech solely
because of its association with organizations that
have been proscribed, like the Communist Party, for
their illegal activities (coupled with political
considerations). De Jonge establishes, however, that
the government may not proscribe peaceable
expression and association because of the nature of
the group with which an individual speaks and
associates.
The government attempts to distinguish these
precedents on the ground that the material-support
law penalizes the conduct of material support, not
association itself. Pet. 19. But that rationale is
inapplicable to the provisions as applied here, which
penalize not conduct, but pure speech. Plaintiffs seek
to protect only pure speech, and thus the provisions
as applied here penalize no conduct at all. See supra
pp. 17, 23-24.
The fact that the challenged provisions
simultaneously target speech and association makes
them doubly invalid. Speech nearly always involves
some associational element, in that speakers speak
to listeners, and, particularly when it comes to
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political expression, often speak in association with
others. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at
908 (“‘Effective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association, as this
Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech
and assembly.’”) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
Here, the statute selectively criminalizes speech
on the basis of the association of speaker and
listeners. According to the government, the statute
requires no showing of intent to further a designated
group’s unlawful activities. As applied to plaintiffs’
intended speech, therefore, the challenged provisions
violate this Court’s long-established principle that
association may not be penalized absent proof that
an individual specifically intended to further an
organization’s illegal ends.
V.

O’BRIEN IS NOT APPLICABLE AND
WOULD NOT SAVE THE CHALLENGED
PROVISIONS
AS
APPLIED
TO
PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED SPEECH

The government has incorrectly suggested that
the challenged provisions are sustainable as a
content-neutral regulation of conduct under United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Pet. 1920. The O’Brien intermediate scrutiny standard does
not apply in this case for three reasons: (1) as
applied, the challenged provisions regulate not
conduct, but pure speech; (2) they do so on contentbased grounds; and (3) they directly infringe
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expressive association. In any event, the provisions
as applied here would not satisfy intermediate
scrutiny, because the government cannot establish
that penalizing plaintiffs’ pure speech promoting
peaceable, nonviolent activities is remotely tailored
to serve any legitimate interest.
A. O’Brien Is Inapplicable
The Court has applied O’Brien’s intermediate
standard of review to laws that regulate conduct
directly, but incidentally affect expression connected
with the regulated conduct. In O’Brien itself, the
Court upheld a regulation that prohibited the
destruction of draft cards as applied to an individual
who burned his draft card to protest the war. 391
U.S. at 369. The government had a legitimate,
speech-neutral reason for preserving draft cards to
sustain the orderly functioning of the selective
service. Id. at 380. The fact that O’Brien sought to
violate the law to make a political point did not
render the prohibition of his conduct invalid, where
the government’s interest in regulating the conduct
was unrelated to expression. Id.
That reasoning is inapplicable here for multiple
reasons. First, O’Brien is limited to regulation of
expressive conduct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
406 (1989) (“[G]overnment generally has a freer
hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in
restricting the written or spoken word”) (emphasis
added). Thus, the O’Brien standard by its terms
would not apply to a ban on speech opposing the
draft. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582
(1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The four-part
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enquiry described in United States v. O’Brien,
judg[es] the limits of appropriate state action
burdening expressive acts as distinct from pure
speech or representation”) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), for
example, involving a conviction for wearing a jacket
with an offensive anti-draft expression, the Court
rejected application of O’Brien or any other lower
form of scrutiny, because Cohen was penalized not
for his conduct, but for “communication”:
The conviction quite clearly rests upon the
asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used
to convey his message to the public. The only
‘conduct’ which the State sought to punish is
the fact of communication. Thus, we deal here
with a conviction resting solely upon ‘speech,’
not upon any separately identifiable conduct ....
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), the Court refused to apply the
O’Brien standard to Georgia’s rape shield law,
stating:
The Georgia cause of action for invasion of
privacy through public disclosure of the name of
a rape victim imposes sanctions on pure
expression—the content of a publication—and
not conduct or a combination of speech and
nonspeech elements that might otherwise be
open to regulation or prohibition.
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Id. at 495 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77).
The fact that other aspects of the statute prohibit
conduct does not make O’Brien applicable to the
provisions at issue here. If the regulation in O’Brien
had banned not only draft card destruction, but also
speech critical of the draft, a prosecution for an antidraft speech would not have triggered O’Brien
intermediate scrutiny. In order for O’Brien to apply
at all in an as-applied challenge, the law in question
must be applied to conduct, not speech itself. But
plaintiffs’ proposed activities are pure speech.
Second, O’Brien is limited to content-neutral
laws, and the provisions challenged here
discriminate on the basis of content. In Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 402-03, for example, the Court
declined to apply O’Brien to a law banning flag
desecration because it concluded that the law
discriminated on the basis of content. Where, as
here, a statute on its face targets expression based
on its content, the government’s interest cannot be
said to be “unrelated to the suppression of free
expression,” a critical threshold requirement for
O’Brien scrutiny. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
Third, O’Brien does not apply where, as here, a
law directly regulates expressive association. In Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000),
the Court held O’Brien inapplicable where a state’s
general
ban
on
discrimination
in
public
accommodations was applied to the Boy Scouts in a
way that “directly and immediately affects
associational rights” (by restricting its ability to
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choose who would serve as a scoutmaster). As the
Court explained:
A law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards
only incidentally affects the free speech rights
of those who happen to use a violation of that
law as a symbol of protest. But New Jersey's
public accommodations law directly and
immediately affects associational rights, in this
case associational rights that enjoy First
Amendment protection.
Thus, O’Brien is
inapplicable.
Id. at 659. The Court similarly rejected the
invocation of O’Brien to defend patronage practices
because they directly regulated pure association.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). As the Court
explained, “O’Brien dealt with the constitutionality
of laws regulating the ‘nonspeech’ elements of
expressive conduct. No such regulation is involved
here, for it is association and belief per se, not any
particular form of conduct, [that is at issue].” Id. at
363 n.17.
As in Elrod and Dale, so here, the application of
the law directly infringes plaintiffs’ rights of
expressive association. It “directly and immediately”
precludes them from engaging in speech in
association with the PKK or the LTTE. O’Brien
therefore does not apply.
The government argued below that the materialsupport law is analogous to laws this Court has
upheld restricting trade and travel with particular
foreign nations. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S.
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222 (1984). But the trade and travel regulations are
critically different. They regulate conduct (travel
and financial transactions), not pure speech. So
while an individual who engages in the conduct of
proscribed trade or travel for expressive purposes
would find his challenge analyzed under O’Brien, the
provisions as applied here criminalize pure speech
and association. In Regan v. Wald itself, the Court
pointedly distinguished the permissible “general ban
on travel to Cuba” from impermissible efforts to
“selectively … deny passports on the basis of political
affiliation” with the Communist Party, struck down
in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964),
and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). See Regan,
468 U.S. at 241. Thus, intermediate scrutiny is not
applicable here.
B. The Challenged Provisions Could Not
Survive Even Intermediate Scrutiny
Were the Court to apply intermediate scrutiny,
the challenged provisions would still fail. O’Brien
holds that a regulation of conduct that incidentally
affects speech will be sustained:
if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental
restriction
on
alleged
First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
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The provisions as applied here fail intermediate
scrutiny because – even aside from their being
anything but unrelated to the suppression of
expression31 – they “burden … more speech than is
necessary to further the government’s legitimate
interests.”
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
While
intermediate scrutiny does not demand that the
government use the least restrictive means to
further its ends, it still must “demonstrate that the
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way.” Turner Broadcasting,
512 U.S. at 664. Without evidence that speech
advocating wholly lawful, nonviolent ends furthers
terrorism, the government has not met its burden of
showing the requisite fit between these provisions
and its legitimate national security interests, even
under the more lenient O’Brien standard.
VI.

THE COURT CAN AVOID THESE
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS
BY
INTERPRETING THE STATUTE TO
PROHIBIT ONLY SPEECH INTENDED
TO FURTHER UNLAWFUL ENDS

In the courts below, plaintiffs argued that the
statute should be interpreted to prohibit only speech
intended to further a group’s illegal ends. The lower
courts declined to adopt such an interpretation with
respect to the statute as a whole. But adopting such
31

The Court in more recent cases has treated the criterion
that a measure be “unrelated to the suppression of expression”
as a threshold requirement for application of O’Brien at all, and
accordingly plaintiffs addressed it above. See supra, Point V.A.
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an interpretation with respect to the provisions
challenged here would be consistent with Congress’s
directive that the statute not be “construed or
applied” in a way that would violate First
Amendment rights. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i). Such an
interpretation would also fully support the relief
plaintiffs
seek,
while
avoiding
substantial
constitutional questions. Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (“[W]here a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and
by the other of which such questions are avoided, our
duty is to adopt the latter.”) (internal citations
omitted).32
A.

The Statute Should Be Interpreted to
Require Proof of Intent to Further a
Designated Organization’s Illegal Ends

The Court can avoid the constitutional problems
identified above if it interprets the challenged
provisions to require proof of intent to further the
designated organization’s illegal activities when
applied to pure speech and association. This Court
adopted precisely that interpretation of the Smith
Act in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
The relevant language of the material-support
statute is, if anything, even more susceptible to such
an interpretation than the Smith Act.
The construction plaintiffs propose, requiring proof of
intent to further a group’s terrorist activities, would not
necessarily save the statute’s constitutionality in every context,
but because it would fully protect plaintiffs here, it would
permit the Court to avoid resolution of a constitutional
question.
32
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The Smith Act criminalized “membership” in
organizations that advocated violent overthrow,
“knowing the purpose thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
The statute did not by its terms require intent to
further the group’s illegal aims. Yet to avoid due
process and First Amendment concerns, the Court
interpreted the statute to require, not merely the
knowledge of the group’s purposes specified on the
face of the statute, but also “‘specific[] inten[t] to
accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to
violence.’” Scales, 367 U.S. at 229 (quoting Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).
On its face, the material-support statute also
criminalizes “knowing” provision of training, expert
advice, service, and personnel, and raises similar
constitutional concerns. Here, as in Scales, the
Court can avoid those constitutional questions by
interpreting the statute to require proof of intent to
further a designated organization’s illegal ends.
The court of appeals declined to adopt this
interpretation. It reasoned that the statute in Scales
was “silent as to mens rea,” whereas 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B includes a requirement that defendants
“know” that the organization they are supporting is
designated “terrorist” or has engaged in violent
activities. The court concluded that it would be
inconsistent with Congress’s requirement of
“knowledge” of the group’s terrorist character to also
require “intent” to further the group’s illegal
activities. Pet. App. 16a.
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Contrary to the court of appeals’ reasoning,
however, the Smith Act interpreted in Scales was not
silent on mens rea. Like 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, it
required “knowing” support. This Court nonetheless
concluded
that
to
preserve
the
statute’s
constitutionality, it should be interpreted to require
specific intent to further the Party’s illegal ends. A
heightened
intent
requirement,
to
avoid
constitutional difficulties, is thus consistent with an
express “knowing” requirement.
With respect to § 2339B, there is both statutory
language and legislative history to support this
narrowing construction – neither of which existed in
the Smith Act. Congress expressly invited such an
interpretation when, aware that courts had
identified constitutional flaws in the statute, it
provided in 2004 that the statute should not be
“construed or applied” in a manner that would
violate the First Amendment. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i).
When Congress first enacted the statute,
moreover, it stated that it sought to prohibit material
support “to the fullest possible basis, consistent with
the Constitution.” AEDPA, § 301(b), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B note. The bill’s sponsor, Senator Orrin
Hatch, stated in introducing the Conference Report
that:
[t]his bill also includes provisions making it a
crime to knowingly provide material support to
the terrorist functions of terrorist groups
designated by a Presidential finding to be
engaged in terrorist activities. ... I am satisfied
that we have crafted a narrow but effective
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designation provision which meets these
obligations while safeguarding the freedom to
associate.33
To interpret the challenged provisions here to
include a specific intent requirement when speech
and association are at issue would accord with the
Court’s treatment of the Smith Act in Scales, honor
Congress’s express directive that the statute not be
“construed or applied” so as to violate the First
Amendment, and ensure that the law did precisely
what the bill’s sponsor said it would: criminalize
support “to the terrorist functions of terrorist groups
... while safeguarding the freedom to associate.”
B. The Government’s Proposed Statutory
Construction Would Not Avoid the
Constitutional Questions
The government proffers an alternative
construction, which would interpret the statute
simply to exempt “independent advocacy.” Pet. 21.
This construction, however, would not avoid the
constitutional problems with the statute or resolve
the dispute over plaintiffs’ proposed speech. Pure
political speech of the type in which plaintiffs seek to
engage is protected not merely when it is done
“independently,” but also when it is done in
conjunction with others.34 Activities such as writing,
142 Cong. Rec. S3354 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added) (quoted in HLP II, 352 F.3d at
402).
33

See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (“‘[I]mplicit in the right to engage
in activities protected by the First Amendment’ is ‘a

34
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speaking, and teaching do not lose their First
Amendment protection when done in coordination
with others. Bob Woodward, for example, does not
forfeit his First Amendment rights because he writes
under the direction of his Washington Post editors.
Nor did Communist Party members lose their First
Amendment protections because they protested and
demonstrated at the direction of a foreign-dominated
organization. See supra, note 30 (citing cases).
To protect political speech only when it is
undertaken “independently” would strike at the core
of political speech, which almost necessarily involves
associational expression. The government’s notion of
“independent advocacy” would not seem to exempt
speaking to, or in collaboration with, members of the
organization, as plaintiffs propose to do here. Thus,
the proffered interpretation would not permit the
Court to avoid plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.
Moreover,
the
government’s
proposed
construction would introduce even further confusion
to an already vague statute. Citizens would have to
guess at whether their activities were “independent,”
or involved “some collaboration or other relationship
between the giver and the recipient.” Pet. 22. Would
checking facts with a PKK official on a human rights
complaint constitute a “collaboration or other
relationship”
warranting
criminal
sanctions?
Virtually any effort to communicate with a
designated group regarding one’s advocacy could be
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends.’”) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
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viewed as forfeiting independence and entering a
“collaboration or other relationship.”
The
government’s proposed “construction” would not cure
the provisions’ many infirmities, but would only
further muddy the waters.35
In short, the Court can avoid the constitutional
issues presented here only by adopting plaintiffs’
proposed construction, much as it did in Scales.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the Court should
affirm the court of appeals’ decision with respect to
the provisions it held invalid as applied to plaintiffs’
speech, and reverse the court’s decision with respect
to the provisions it upheld.
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APPENDIX
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) and (iv) provide as
follows:
(iii) “Terrorist activity” defined. As used in this Act,
the term “terrorist activity” means any activity
which is unlawful under the laws of the place where
it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws
of the United States or any State) and which involves
any of the following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to
kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including
a governmental organization) to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the individual seized
or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally
protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4)
of title 18, United States Code) or upon the
liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any—
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or
nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or
dangerous device (other than for mere
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personal monetary gain), with intent to
endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of
one or more individuals or to cause
substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of
the foregoing.
(iv) “Engage in terrorist activity” defined. As used in
this Act, the term “engage in terrorist activity”
means, in an individual capacity or as a member of
an organization—
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under
circumstances indicating an intention to cause
death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
(III) to gather information on potential targets
for terrorist activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for—
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in
clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in
clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can
demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that he did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the
organization was a terrorist organization;
(V) to solicit any individual—
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described
in this subsection;
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(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III) unless the
solicitor can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that he did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that
the organization was a terrorist organization;
or
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or
reasonably should know, affords material
support, including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit, false documentation or
identification, weapons (including chemical,
biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or
training—
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows,
or reasonably should know, has committed or
plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in
subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any
member of such an organization; or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in
clause (vi)(III), or to any member of such an
organization,
unless
the
actor
can
demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the actor did not know, and
should not reasonably have known, that the
organization was a terrorist organization.
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2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a) and (d)(2) provide in relevant
part as follows:
Designation of foreign terrorist organizations
(a) Designation.
(1) In general. The Secretary is authorized to
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist
organization in accordance with this subsection if
the Secretary finds that—
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) [8
USCS § 1182(a)(3)(B)][)] or terrorism (as
defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or
retains the capability and intent to engage in
terrorist activity or terrorism[)]; and
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the
organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of
the United States.
* * * * *
(d) Definitions. As used in this section—
* * * * *
(2) the term “national security” means the
national defense, foreign relations, or economic
interests of the United States;

